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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
MARK DEAN ANDERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 950778-CA 
Classification Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a sentence following convictions for 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1994); Driving on Suspended 
or Revoked Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §53-3-227 (1994); and False Information to a Law 
Enforcement Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-8-507 (1983), in the Fifth Judicial District Court in 
and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert T. 
Braithwaite, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (f) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing 
Defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment and staying an 
additional six-month term of imprisonment? "Before the reviewing 
court may overturn the sentence given by the trial court, it must 
be clear that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 
1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991) (Citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1978) (Emphasis added). 
2. If the Court adopts a stricter standard, based upon the 
fact that appellant failed to provide the appellate court with the 
presentence report, is the "presumption of regularity" still 
applicable? In order to avoid errors, sentencing procedures 
require a somewhat stricter standard than the general presumption 
of regularity. State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) . 
Even if this Court were to take the more rigorous stance, refusing 
to presume the regularity of the proceedings below in absence of 
the presentence report, the proceedings at the sentencing hearing 
amply show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Moreover, the presentence report, as provided by appellee, supports 
the proposition that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
For questions of fact involved in sentencing decisions, frequently 
constituting threshold inquiries that must be satisfied prior to 
addressing the legal intricacies, a "clearly erroneous" standard 
applies. State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049-50 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules 
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are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body of this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the sentence, set forth in a Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and 
Commitment by the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite, Fifth Judicial 
District Court, following a trial. 
On or about April 24, 1995, the Defendant was convicted of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann, §41-6-44 (1994); Driving on Suspended 
or Revoked Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §53-3-227 (1994); and False Information to a Law 
Enforcement Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-8-507 (1983). Following a presentence investigation 
report, as prepared by the Utah Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole, sentencing occurred on October 10, 1995, and the Defendant 
was sentenced to one (1) year in the Iron County Jail pursuant to 
his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class 
A Misdemeanor; six (6) months in the Iron County Jail pursuant to 
his conviction for Driving on a Suspended or Revoked Operator's 
License, a Class B Misdemeanor, said term to run consecutively to 
the one (1) year term set forth above; and six (6) months in the 
Iron County Jail pursuant to his conviction of False Information to 
a Law Enforcement Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, said term of 
imprisonment to run concurrently with the other sentences. 
Moreover, the Court sentenced the Defendant to pay a fine in the 
sum and amount $900, and ordered the Defendant to pay restitution 
in the amount of $5,000 as a term and condition of any probation 
the Defendant may receive. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 8, 1994, on Interstate 15 near Cedar City, Utah, 
Adam Russell was driving a vehicle (pulling a trailer) and was 
traveling toward his home when his vehicle was struck violently 
from behind by another vehicle. Mr. Russell's vehicle careened off 
the highway and rolled, causing serious injuries to Mr. Russell and 
severely damaging Mr. Russell's vehicle and trailer. Mr. Russell 
suffered neck injuries that required treatment with a "halo" and 
pins in his head for several weeks. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
Doug Twitchell responded to the accident scene and located another 
male individual "hiding in the bushes" and obviously intoxicated. 
The individual, later identified as Defendant Mark Dean Anderson, 
initially gave Trooper Twitchell the name of his brother (who is 
deceased), and it took several hours for Trooper Twitchell to learn 
that the Defendant had provided a false name. The State asserted 
at sentencing that the Defendant submitted the false name as 
Defendant has an extensive criminal record, numerous wants and 
warrants throughout the state of Utah, and the Defendant has not 
held a valid Utah driver's license since 1985. 
The Defendant was tried twice in absentia, after several 
efforts to locate the Defendant for trial and sentencing failed, 
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but each time the Defendant objected and the matter was set for a 
new trial date. On April 24, 1995, the Defendant was again 
convicted (in his absence) of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor; Driving on Suspended or Revoked 
Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor; and False Information to 
a Law Enforcement Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor. The Defendant 
fled to the state of Oregon, was located, and refused to waive 
extradition. The Iron County Attorney's Office forwarded a 
governor's warrant to Oregon and, after several hearings in Oregon 
regarding extradition and days before the governor's warrant was to 
arrive, the Defendant waived extradition and was returned to Utah. 
On September 6, 1995, the Defendant appeared before the Court 
for sentencing. The Court ordered a presentence investigation 
report prior to sentencing, to be prepared by the Utah Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole, and upon completion of the 
presentence report the matter was called on for sentencing on 
October 10, 1995, at 9:00 a.m., in Cedar City, Utah. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not provided this Court with a copy of the 
presentence report, and so it should presume regularity in the 
proceedings below and decline to consider Defendant's claims. 
However, even without the report, the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing shows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
sentencing the Defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment in 
the Iron County Jail, staying an additional six-month sentence, and 
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ordering the Defendant to pay a fine in the sum and amount of $900 
and restitution in sum and amount of $5,000. The presentence 
report, as set forth and included in appellee's brief, clearly 




REGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD BE 
PRESUMED WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED TO INCLUDE IN 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
HOWEVER, RELYING ONLY ON THE RECORD OF THE 
SENTENCING HEARING, THE RECORD INDICATES THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT. 
"Before the reviewing court may overturn the sentence given by 
the trial court, it must be clear that the actions of the judge 
were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991) (Citing State 
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
"The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to 
upset the judgment." State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985) 
(Quoting State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)). 
In this case, Defendant has failed to include in the record on 
appeal the presentence report containing relevant information 
regarding the Defendant's background and criminal history which 
undoubtedly formed the basis of the trial court's sentencing 
decision. On such failure, this Court may decline to review the 
merits of Defendant's claim, presuming regularity in the 
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proceedings below. See State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988) 
per curiam (presuming regularity in the proceedings below where the 
Defendant, challenging the trial court's discretion in denying him 
a 90-day diagnostic evaluation and sentencing him to a potential 
life sentence, failed to provide the court with a copy of the 
presentence report from which it might have assessed the trial 
court's discretion); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (1983) 
(presuming regularity in the proceedings below where, though no 
transcript of the sentencing hearing was provided the appellate 
court, there was no suggestion that a presentence report was 
effectively concealed from the defendant.) 
The Defendant's only argument is that the trial court abused 
its discretion in sentencing the Defendant because the sentencing 
judge stated, "I think you've been deceptive with the Court, 
dishonest with the Court. You have a serious drinking problem, 
criminal problem. This, to me, is a clear cut case that requires 
the maximum sentence." (Tr. 9) The Defendant fails to set forth any 
case law or statutory support for the proposition that these 
statements by the trial court constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The Defendant's argument is frivolous. 
The Defendant then argues that Article I, Section 9 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, and the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution have been violated as the Court's 
sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Again, the 
Defendant fails to cite case law or statutory authority for the 
proposition that a sentencing judge cannot impose consecutive 
sentences. Moreover, it should be noted that if the trial court 
had deemed it appropriate, the Defendant could have been sentenced 
to an additional six (6) months, consecutive to the two (2) other 
counts, causing for a total term of incarceration of twenty-four 
(24) months, as opposed to the eighteen (18) months actually 
imposed by the trial court. Again, the Defendant's argument is 
frivolous. 
Finally, the sentence imposed by the trial court was within 
the parameters provided by law with respect to the terms of 
imprisonment (Utah Code Ann. §76-3-204 (1973)), the fine (Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-301 (1995)), and the restitution (Utah Code Ann. §76-3-
201 (1995) ) . 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE TO TAKE THE MORE 
RIGOROUS STANCE, REFUSING TO PRESUME THE 
REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW IN ABSENCE 
OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT, THE PROCEEDINGS AT 
THE SENTENCING HEARING AMPLY SHOW THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Utah 1980) (citing State 
v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1979), stands for the 
proposition that, in order to avoid errors, sentencing procedures 
require a somewhat stricter standard than the general presumption 
of regularity. Even if this Court were to take the more rigorous 
stance, refusing to presume the regularity of the proceedings below 
in absence of the presentence report, the proceedings at the 
sentencing hearing amply show the trial court did not abuse its 
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discretion. The transcript from the sentencing proceedings, 
setting forth the statements by the sentencing judge ("I think 
you've been deceptive with the Court, dishonest with the Court. 
You have a serious drinking problem, criminal problem. This, to 
me, is a clear cut case that requires the maximum sentence.") is 
not an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, the State has included the presentence investigation 
report (see Appendix A) , and the State of Utah asserts that the 
presentence report provided the sentencing judge with a sufficient 
basis upon which to sentence the Defendant to eighteen (18) months 
in the Iron County Jail, with a six- (6-) month sentence stayed, 
together with a $900 fine and restitution in the amount of $5,000. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Defendant's 
sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22 day of February, 1996. 
S ( W T ^ B15RNS 
Iron County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two (2) full, true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Mr. Keith 
C. Barnes, Esquire, Attorney for Appellant, P.O. Box 765, Cedar 
City, Utah 84721-0765, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, 
on this 2-Z- day of February, 1996. 
scmr H. BURNS 
Iron County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
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APPENDIX A 
41-6-41 MOTOR VEHICLES 71$ 
41-6-41. Statistical information regarding accidents — 
Annual publication. 
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all accident 
reports and shall publish annually, or at more frequent 
intervals, related statistical information as to the number and 
circumstances of traffic accidents. 1987 
41-6-42. Local powers to require report. 
A local authority may by ordinance require that the operator 
of a vehicle involved in any accident, or the owner of the 
vehicle, also file with the designated municipal department a 
\*rritten report of the accident or a copy of any report required 
under this article to be filed with the department on accidents 
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confi-
dential use of the municipal department and are subject to 
Section 41-6-40. 1987 
ARTICLES 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and reck-
less dr iv ing ordinances — Consistent wi th 
code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs 
a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a 
niotor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of 
those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or 
evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any 
combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the 
provisions m this code which govern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs 
reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be 
consistent with the provisions of this code which govern those 
inatters. 1987 
41-6-43.10. Repealed . 1985 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, 
or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol con-
centration — Measurement of blood or breath 
alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest 
without warrant — Penalties — Suspension 
or revocation of license — Penalties. 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test 
given within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control; or 
(li) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of aicohoi and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a 
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this 
section 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol 
concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a 
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a* 
(l) class B misdemeanor; or 
(n) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon an-
other as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
IB) had a passenger under lfc years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of 
simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of 
care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person 
exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes 
any similar local ordinance adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 
hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the 
person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
the court may order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility 
if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita-
tion fecftfty dfcteTT&infes that thfe pfeTson has a prohiem 
condition involving alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation under this section the 
court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor 
more than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the 
person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a 
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order 
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of two prior violations under this section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in 
Subsections (ii) and (7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convic-
tions are for violations committed after April 23, 
1990. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of 
any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not 
\ess than lib noT more than %\W> houTB. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court shall as part of 
any sentence impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 
hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
MUiUK vu.nioii.&a • * A - V F - * « - * 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion 
of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro-
gram approved by the court may be a sentencing 
alternative to incarceration or community service if 
the program provides intensive care or inpatient 
treatment and long-term closely supervised follow 
through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of the prior violations under 
this section is a third degree felony if at least three prior 
convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 
1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine 
of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 
hours. 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require 
the person to work in a community-service work 
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720 
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not 
serve the jail sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by 
the court may be a sentencing alternative to incar-
ceration or community service if the program pro-
vides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-
term closely supervised follow through after the 
treatment. 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-
service work program, the court shall order the person to 
obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency reha-
bilitation facility. 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required 
under this section may not be suspended and the con-
victed person is not eligible for parole or probation until 
any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a 
violation under this section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license sus-
pended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this 
section, until the convicted person has furnished evidence 
satisfactory to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assess-
ment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation or-
dered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993, 
have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution 
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person 
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or 
subsequent conviction for a violation committed 
within six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive 
or illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the convic-
tion is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior 
violations committed after July 1, 1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7) 
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted 
person to: participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency 
rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment 
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity; or do any combination of those things, apply to a 
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that 
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection (10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regard-
ing education or treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connec-
tion with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior convic-
tion under Subsection (10), as the court would render 
in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of 
Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction 
under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction 
under Subsection (10), is a first, second, or subsequent 
conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction 
under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered 
a prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation pro-
g r a m e d any community-based or other education pro-
gram provided for in this section shall be approved by the 
Department of Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty 
or no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under Section 
41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an 
original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis 
for the plea, including whether or not there had been 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the viola-
tion. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts 
that shows whether there was consumption of alco-
hol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, 
in connection with the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before 
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the 
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as 
follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of 
guilty or no contest to a charge of violating Section 
41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the record that 
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation, the resulting conviction is a prior con-
viction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and 
(7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each con-
viction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the 
purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7). 
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable 
cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the violation was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(l) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a 
person convicted for the first time under Subsection 
(1); and 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection 
(1) if the violation is committed within a period of six 
years from the date of the prior violation. 
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(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension 
or revocation period the number of days for which a 
license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223, 
if the previous suspension was based on the same occur-
rence upon which the recqrd of conviction is based. 1994 
41-6-44.1. Procedures— Acjjudicative proceedings. 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
adjudicative proceedings. 1987 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 1983 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — 
Evidence. 
(1) The <x>inmissioner of the Department of Public Safety 
shall establish standards for the administration and interpre-
tation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including 
standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to 
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or 
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made 
and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards 
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular 
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act, 
condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate 
their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under 
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been 
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and 
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnec-
essary. 1987 
41-6-44.4. Person under 21 may not operate vehicle 
with detectable alcohol in body — Chemical 
test procedures — Temporary license — Hear-
ing and decision — Suspension of license or 
operating privilege — Fees — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) As used in this section "local substance abuse au-
thority* has the same meaning as provided in Section 
62A-8-101. 
(b) Calculations of blood, breath, or urine alcohol con-
centration under this section shall be made in accordance 
with the procedures in Subsection 41-6-44(2). 
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age may not 
operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle with 
any measurable blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentra-
tion in his body as shown by a chemical test. 
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license who 
violates Subsection (a), in addition to any other 
applicable penalties arising out of the incident, shall 
have his operator license denied or suspended as 
provided in Subsection (ii). 
(ii) (A) For a first offense under Subsection (a), the 
Driver License Division of the Department of 
Public Safety shall deny the person's operator 
license if ordered or not challenged under this 
section for a period of 90 days beginning on the 
30th day after the date of the arrest under 
Section 32A-12-209. 
(B) For a second or subsequent offense under 
Subsection (a), within three years of a prior 
denial or suspension, the Driver License Division 
shall suspend the person's operator license for a 
period of one year beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest, 
(c) (i) A person who has not been issued an operator 
license who violates Subsection (a), in addition to any 
other penalties arising out of the incident, shall be 
punished as provided in Subsection (ii). 
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, whichever is 
longer, a person may not operate a vehicle and the 
Driver License Division may not issue the person an 
operator license or learner's permit. ^ 
(3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a person may be violating or has violated 
Subsection (2), the peace officer may, in connection with 
arresting the person for a violation of Section 32A-12-209* 
request that the person submit to a chemical test or tests 
to be administered in compliance with the standards 
under Section 41-6-44.10. > 
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the 
person's submission to a chemical test that a test result 
indicating a violation of Subsection (2Xa) will result in 
denial or suspension of the person's license to operate a 
motor vehicle or a refusal to issue a license. 
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test 
results indicate a blood, breath, or urine alcohol content 
in violation of Subsection (2)(a), or if the officer makes a 
determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the" 
person is otherwise in violation of Subsection (2Xa), the 
officer directing administration of the test or making the' 
determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the 
Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver 
License Division's intention to deny or suspend the per-
son's license to operate a vehicle or refusal to issue a 
license under Subsection (2). ' ; 
(4) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of 
the Driver License Division, he shall: r* 
(a) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of 
the operator; 
(b) issue a temporary license certificate effective for 
only 29 days if the driver had a valid operator's license; 
and * 
(c) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by 
the Driver License Division, basic information regarding 
how to obtain a prompt hearing before the Driver License 
Division. O 
(5) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as'fy 
form by the Driver License Division, serve also as the tempo^  
rary license certificate under Subsection (4)(b). ^ 
(6) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the* 
Driver License Division within five days after the date of 
arrest and service of the notice: < J | 
(a) the person's driver license certificate, if any; -s | 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; $ | 
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the Driver 
License Division indicating the chemical test results, ui 
any; and 1 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that* 
the person has violated Subsection (2).
 ; j | 
(7) (a) (i) Upon written request, the Driver License Oiw 
sion shall grant to the person an opportunity to W^ 
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest undefj 
Section 32A-12-209. * m 
(ii) The request shall be made within ten daysfl 
the date of the arrest. '3 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the Driver Li<#*?| 
Division in the county in which the arrest occaX^jji 
unless the Driver License Division and the person fl#*| 
that the hearing may be held in some other county, j f 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cQl$4 
the issues of: 
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53-3-226. Grounds for confiscation of licenses, plates, 
and other articles issued by state — Addi-
tional fee for reinstatement. 
(1) (a) The division, any peace officer acting in his official 
capacity, or a person authorized under Subsection (2) may 
take possession of any certificate of title, registration 
card, decal, permit, license certificate, registration plate, 
or any other article issued by the state: 
(i) upon expiration, denial, suspension, disqualifi-
cation, revocation, alteration, or cancellation of it; 
(ii) that is fictitious; 
(iii) that has been unlawfully or erroneously is-
sued; or 
(iv) that is unlawfully or erroneously displayed, 
(b) A receipt shall be issued that describes each confis-
cated item. 
(2) The division may enter into contractual agreements 
with constables or other law enforcement agencies to facilitate 
confiscation of items listed in Subsection (1) if a person fails or 
refuses to surrender any of those documents to the division 
upon demand. 
(3) The division shall assess against a person making an 
application referred to in Subsection 53-3-205(14), in addition 
to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under 
Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the1 person's 
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover the costs required to 
serve orders related to the purposes of Subsection (2) 1993 
53-3-227. Driving a motor vehicle prohibited while 
license denied, suspended, disqualified, or re-
voked — Penalties. 
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the laws 
of the state in which his license was issued and who drives any 
motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while that 
license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be 
punished as provided in this section. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other 
than a violation specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class 
C misdemeanor. 
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose 
conviction under Subsection (1) is based on his driving a 
motor vehicle while his license is suspended, disqualified, 
or revoked for: 
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under 
Section 41-6-44.10; 
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44; 
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance that complies 
with the requirements of Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) a violation of Section 41-6-44.6; 
(v) a violation of Section 76-5-207; 
(vi) a criminal action that the person plead guilty 
to as a result of a plea bargain after having been 
originally charged with violating one or more of the 
sections or ordinances under this subsection; 
(vii) a revocation or suspension which has been 
extended under Subsection 53-3-220 (2); or 
(viii) where disqualification is the result of driving 
a commercial motor vehicle while the person's CDL is 
disqualified, suspended, canceled, or revoked under 
Subsection 53-3-414(1). 
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose 
conviction under Subsection (1) is based upon his driving 
a motor vehicle while his license is suspended, disquali-
fied, or revoked in his state of licensure for violations 
corresponding to the violations listed in Subsection (a). 
(c) A fine imposed under this subsection shall be at 
least the maximum fine for a class C misdemeanor under 
Section 76-3-301. 1994 
53-3-228. Making false affidavit i s perjury. 
A person who makes any false affidavit or knowingl 
or affirms falsely, to any matter or thing required UE 
chapter to be sworn to or affirmed, is guilty of perjury 
53-3-229. Prohibited uses of license certificate 
alty. 
It is a class C misdemeanor for a person to: 
(1) display, cause or permit to be displayed, or 
in possession any license certificate knowing it is f 
or has been canceled, denied, revoked, suspend 
qualified, or altered; 
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a 
certificate issued to him, by a person not entitled 
(3) display or to represent as his own a license 
cate not issued to him; 
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the divisioi 
demand any license certificate that has been 
suspended, disqualified, canceled, or revoked; 
(5) use a false name or give a false address 
application for a license or any renewal or duplicate 
license certificate, or to knowingly make a false 
ment, or to knowingly conceal a material fact or oth 
commit a fraud in the application; or 
(6) permit any other prohibited use of a license 
cate issued to him. 
53-3-230. Violation of part — Misdemeanor. 
A violation of this part is a class C misdemeanor, 
otherwise specified. 
PART 3 
IMPAIRED PERSONS LICENSING 
53-3-301. Short title. 
This part is known as the "Impaired Persons Licensing 
53-3-302. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Board" means the Driver License Medical Ad^  
Board created in Section 53-3-303. 
(2) "Health care professional" means a physici 
surgeon licensed to practice medicine in the sta 
when recommended by the Medical Advisory Board 
include other health care professionals licensed to co 
physical examinations in this state. . 
(3) (a) "Impaired person" means a person who " 
mental, emotional, or nonstable physical disabi 
disease that may impair the person's ability to 
cise reasonable and ordinary control at all time 
a motor vehicle while driving on the highways 
(b) "Impaired person" does not include a p 
having a nonprogressive or stable physical ir 
ment that is objectively observable and that no. 
evaluated by a functional driving examination. " 
53-3-303. Driver License Medical Advisory Boa 
Membership — Guidelines for licensini 
paired persons — Recommendations to 
sion. 
(1) There is created within the division the Driver Li 
Medical Advisory Board. 
(2) (a) The board is comprised of three regular meif 
appointed by the executive director of the Departm 
Health. 
(b) The board shall be assisted by expert panel 
bers nominated by the board as necessary and fc 
proved by the executive director of the Departm* 
Health. 
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ffl-S-104. Misdemeanors classified. 
ft)" Misdemeanors are classified into three categories: 
(a) Class A misdemeanors; 
(b) Class B misdemeanors; 
(c) Class C misdemeanors. 
f2) An offense designated a misdemeanor, either in this 
; \ or in another law, without specification as to punishment 
^category, [s a class B misdemeanor. 1973 
L-3-105. Infractions. 
ill) Infractions are not classified. 
I$2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is 
Sn>ressly designated and any offense defined outside this code 
Pj*jch is not designated as a felony or misdemeanor and for 
which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 1978 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
HJ-3-201. Sentences or combinat ion of sentences al-
lowed — Civil penalt ies — Rest i tut ion — 
Hearing — Definitions — Resentenc ing — Ag-
gravation or mit igat ion of cr imes w i th man-
datory sentences [Effective unti l April 29, 
1996]. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the 
defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for 
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentenc-
ing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, 
but not general damages, which a person could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal ac-
tivities and includes the money equivalent of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal pay-
ment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including the 
accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured 
damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental 
entity for extradition or transportation and as further 
defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court de-
termines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result 
of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in 
the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may 
•entence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the 
Mowing sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or 
private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided 
by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without 
parole; or 
(g) to death. 
w) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority 
conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity 
tha t has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition 
to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order tha t the defendant make restitution to victims 
of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitu-
tion as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of 
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-38-2 and family member has the meaning 
as defined in Section 77-37-2. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropri-
ate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures 
as provided in Subsections (4Xc) and (4Xd). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitu-
tion, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of 
complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) on 
the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the 
order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment en-
forceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and the person in whose favor the restitution order is 
entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, the Department of Correc-
tions may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for 
payment of restitution and the victim or department 
elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, 
the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a 
lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall 
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest 
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of 
sentencing. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state 
under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve 
pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal 
activity in the county to which he has been returned, 
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, order tha t the defendant make restitu-
tion for costs expended by any governmental entity 
for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropri-
ate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection 
(4X0. 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall deter-
mine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution nec-
essary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by 
the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitu-
tion the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the 
defendant to pay as a par t of the criminal sentence a t 
the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered resti-
tution shall be determined as provided in Subsection 
(8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines tha t restitution is appro-
priate or inappropriate under this subsection, the 
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court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to 
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be entitled 
to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of 
court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a 
lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall 
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules 
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest 
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of 
sentencing. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, 
or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the 
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on 
the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may 
impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay resti-
tution of governmental transportation expenses if the 
defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one 
county to another within the state at governmental 
expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay 
restitution of governmental transported-'on expenses if 
any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or 
on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued 
fox an ixtfrartioir, OT 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to 
a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation ex-
penses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be calculated 
according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is 
transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is 
transported; 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is 
transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection 
(c)(i) applies to each defendant transported regard-
less of the number of defendants actually transported 
in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was con-
victed mandates that one of three stated minimum terms 
shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the 
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party 
may submit a statement identifying circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. 
If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the 
court and served on the opposing party at least four days 
priot to tVve tixofc set for se^teftcmg. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances 
that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the 
court may consider the record in the case, the probation 
officer's report, other reports, including reports received 
under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or 
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, 
and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing 
hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts 
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower 
term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall 
consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravation and 
mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal 
and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been 
sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison 
the court may, within 120 days of the date of commit-
ment on its own motion, or at any time upon the 
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole 
recall the sentence and commitment previously or-
dered and resentence the defendant in the same 
manner as if the defendant had not previously been 
sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater 
than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory 
time prescribed by statute. 
(ii) The resentencing shall take into consideration 
the sentencing guidelines established under this sec-
tion by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile 
Justice to eliminate disparity of sentences and to 
promote uniformity of sentencing, 
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served. 
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its choice of 
sentence on the record at the time of sentencing. 
(n) The court shall also inform the defendant as 
part of the sentence that, if the defendant is released 
from prison, the defendant may be on parole for a 
period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as 
child kidnaping, rape of a child, object rape of a child, 
sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the 
defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, 
and ii the chaTge is set ioTth in the information or 
indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true 
by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sen-
tenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. 
This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting 
provision of law. 
(#) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an 
offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct 
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to 
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of 
an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a 
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any 
person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal con-
duct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other condi-
tions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all 
relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense 
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of prop-
erty of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related pro-
fessional services and devices relating to physical, 
psychiatric, and psychological care, including non-
medical care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the 
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and 
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the in-
come lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related ser* 
vices if the offense resulted in the death of a victiik 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other condi* 
tions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall cofl* 
sider the factors listed in Subsection (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and tW 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, wiw* 
regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
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(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution 
on an installment basis or on other conditions to be 
fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of 
the payment of restitution and the method of pay-
ment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court deter-
mines make restitution inappropriate, 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may 
defer entering an order of restitution if the court deter-
mines that the complication and prolongation of the 
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of 
restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs 
the need to provide restitution to the victim. 1995 
Sentences or combination of sentences 
allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution — 
Hearing — Definitions — Resentencing — Ag-
gravation or mitigation of crimes with man-
datory sentences [Effective April 29,1996]. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or any other crimi-
nal conduct for which the defendant admits respon-
sibility to the sentencing court with or without an 
admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special dam-
ages, but not general damages, which a person could 
recover against the defendant in a civil action arising 
out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent 
of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise 
harmed, and losses including earnings and medical 
expanses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal 
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including 
the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, 
insured damages, and payment for expenses to a 
governmental entity for extradition or transportation 
and as further defined in Subsection (4Xc). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court 
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a 
result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant 
in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court 
may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one 
of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or 
private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically pro-
vided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison 
without parole; or 
(g) on or after April 29, 1996, to imprisonment at 
not less than five years and which may be for life for 
an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and 
Sections 76-5-301.1 and 76-5-302; or 
(h) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of author-
ity conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal ac-
tivity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make resti-
tution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection, or for conduct for which the defen-
dant has agreed to make restitution as part of a 
plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a 
victim has the meaning as defined in Section 
77-38-2 and family member has the meaning as 
defined in 77-37-2. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is ap-
propriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and 
(4Xd). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes res-
titution, the clerk of the court shall enter an 
order of complete restitution as defined in Sub-
section (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and 
provide notice of the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment 
enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and the person in whose favor the restitu-
tion order is entered may seek enforcement of the 
restitution order in accordance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the Depart-
ment of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, 
enforce the restitution order as judgment credi-
tor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order 
for payment of restitution and the victim or 
department elects to pursue collection of the 
order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled 
to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution consti-
tutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket 
and shall have the same effect and is subject to 
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount or-
dered from the time of sentencing. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this 
state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to 
resolve pending criminal charges and is con-
victed of criminal activity in the county to which 
he has been returned, the court may, in addition 
to any other sentence it may impose, order that 
the defendant make restitution for costs ex-
pended by any governmental entity for the extra-
dition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is ap-
propriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall de-
termine complete restitution and court-ordered resti-
tution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution 
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses 
caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the resti-
tution the court having criminal jurisdiction or-
ders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered 
restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (8). 
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(d) (1) If the court determines that restitution is 
appropriate or inappropriate under this subsec-
tion, the court shall make the reasons for the 
decision a part of the court record 
(n) In any civil action brought by a victim to 
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be 
entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the 
victim 
(in) A judgment ordenng restitution consti-
tutes a hen when recorded in a judgment docket 
and shall have the same effect and is subject to 
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil 
action Interest shall accrue on the amount or-
dered from the time of sentencing 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, 
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a 
full hearing on the issue 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may 
impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay 
restitution of governmental transportation expenses 
if the defendant was 
(1) transported pursuant to court order from 
one county to another within the state at govern-
mental expense to resolve pending cnmmal 
charges, 
(n) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C 
misdemeanor, and 
(in) convicted of a crime 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay 
restitution of governmental transportation expenses 
if any of the following apply 
(1) the defendant is charged with an infraction 
or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is 
issued for an infraction, or 
(n) the defendant was not transported pursu-
ant to a court order 
(c) (1) Restitution of governmental transportation 
expenses under Subsection (aXO shall be calcu-
lated according to the following schedule 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is 
transported, 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defen-
dant is transported, and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defen-
dant is transported 
(n) The schedule of restitution under Subsec-
tion (c)(i) applies to each defendant transported 
regardless of the number of defendants actually 
transported in a single trip 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was 
convicted mandates that one of three stated mini-
mum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there 
are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the 
crime 
(b) Pnor to or at the time of sentencing, either 
party may submit a statement identifying circum-
stances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting 
additional facts If the statement is in writing, it shall 
be filed with the court and served on the opposing 
party at least four days prior to the time set for 
sentencing 
(c) In determining whether there are circum-
stances that justify imposition of the highest or 
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the 
case, the probation officer's report, other reports, 
including reports received under Section 76-3-404, 
statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by 
the prosecution or the defendant, and any further 
evidence introduced at the sentencing heanng 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts 
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or 
lower term 
(e) The court m determining a just sentence shall 
consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravation 
and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on 
Cnminal and Juvenile Justice 
(7) (a) d) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has 
been sentenced and committed to the Utah State 
Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the date 
of commitment on its own motion, or at any tune 
upon the recommendation of the Board of Par-
dons and Parole, recall the sentence and commit-
ment previously ordered and resentence the de-
fendant in the same manner as if the defendant 
had not previously been sentenced, so long as the 
new sentence is no greater than the initial sen-
tence nor less than the mandatory time pre* 
scribed by statute 
(n) The resentencing shall take into consider-
ation the sentencing guidelines established un-
der this section by the Commission on Cnminal 
and Juvenile Justice to eliminate disparity of 
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentenc-
ing 
(in) Credit shall be given for time served 
(b) (I) The couri shall state the reasons for its 
choice of sentence on the record at the time of 
sentencing 
(u) The court shall also inform the defendant 
as part of the sentence that, if the defendant is 
released from prison, the defendant may be on 
parole for a period of ten years 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for 
an offense, the offense shall include any criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay resti-
tution A victim of an offense, that mvolves as an 
element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of 
cnmmal activity, mcludes any person directly 
harmed by the defendant's cnmmal conduct m the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts, including 
d) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense 
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of 
property of a victim of the offense, 
(n) the cost of necessary medical and related 
professional services and devices relatmg to 
physical, psychiatnc, and psychological care, in-
cluding nonmedical care and treatment rendered 
in accordance with a method of healing recog-
nized by the law of the place of treatment; the 
cost of necessary physical and occupational ther-
apy and rehabilitation, and the income lost by 
the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted m bodily injury to a victim, and 
(in) the cost of necessary funeral and related 
services if the offense resulted m the death of a 
victim 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court 
shall consider the factors listed m Subsection (b) and: 
d) the financial resources of the defendant and 
the burden that payment of restitution will tffl-
vyxv-
pose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitu-
tion on an installment basis or on other condi-
tions to be fixed by the court; 
(Hi) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant 
of the payment of restitution and the method of 
payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court de-
termines make restitution inappropriate, 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may 
defer entering an order of restitution if the court 
determines tha t the complication and prolongation of 
the sentencing process, as a result of considering an 
order of restitution under this subsection, substan-
tially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the 
victim. 1995 (1st as.) 
76-3-201.1. Nonpayment of fine or rest i tut ion as con-
tempt — Imprisonment — Relief w h e r e de-
fault not contempt — Collection of default. 
(1) When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or to make 
restitution defaults in the payment of any installment, the 
court on motion of the prosecution, victim, or upon its own 
motion may require him to show cause why his default should 
not be treated as contempt of court, and may issue a show 
cause citation or a warrant of arrest for his appearance. 
(2) Unless the defendant shows that his default was not 
attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the 
court or to a failure on his part to make a good faith effort to 
make the payment, the court may find tha t his default 
constitutes contempt and may order him committed until the 
fine or the restitution, or a specified part of it, is paid. 
(3) When a fine or an order of restitution is imposed on a 
corporation or unincorporated association, the person autho-
rized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation 
or association shall pay the fine or make the restitution from 
those assets. His failure to do so may be held to be contempt 
unless he makes the showing required in Subsection (2). 
(4) The term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment 
of fines or failure to make restitution shall be set forth in the 
commitment order. 
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court tha t the 
default in the payment of a fine or restitution is not contempt, 
the court may enter an order allowing the defendant addi-
tional time for payment, reducing the amount of the payment 
or of each installment, or revoking the fine or order of 
restitution or the unpaid portion in whole or in part . 
(6) (a) A default in the payment of a fine or costs or failure 
to make restitution or any installment may be collected by 
any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a 
judgment. 
(b) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in 
behalf of a victim. 
(c) The levy of execution for the collection of a fine or 
restitution does not discharge a defendant committed to 
imprisonment for contempt until the amount of the fine or 
restitution has actually been collected. issr 
76-3-201,2, Civil act ion by v i c t im for damages . 
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not 
limit or impair the right of a person injured by a defendant's 
criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the 
defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has 
paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part or 
Section 77-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action 
arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the 
restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution 
paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in 
favor of the victim in the civil action 
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the 
issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a 
victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defen-
dant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action. 1990 
76-3-201.3. Minimum mandatory sentences — Effec-
tive law. 
The Legislature provides that the following sections of the 
Utah Code regarding minimum mandatory sentencing provi-
sions are retained and are considered to be effective law until 
April 29, 1996-
76-3-201, as last amended by Chapters 111, 117, and 301, 
Laws of Utah 1995; 
76-3-406, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws of Utah 
1994; 
76-5-301.1, as last amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah 
1984; 
76-5-302, as last amended by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah 
1983; 
76-5-402.1, as enacted by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1983; 
76-5-402.3, as enacted by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1983; 
76-5-403.1, as last amended by Chapter 156, Laws of Utah 
1988; 
76-5-404.1, as last amended by Chapter 170, Laws of Utah 
1989; 
76-5-405, as last amended by Chapter 170, Laws of Utah 
1989; 
76-5-406.5, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws of Utah 
1994; and 
77-27-9, as last amended by Chapter 13, Laws of Utah 1994. 
1995 (1st S.S.) 
76-3-202. Paroled persons — Termination or discharge 
from sentence — Time served on parole — 
Discretion of Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(1) Every person committed to the state prison to serve an 
indeterminate term and later released on parole shall, upon 
completion of three years on parole outside of confinement and 
without violation, or in the case of a person convicted of 
violating Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(lXe), Sec-
tion 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 
76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, or attempting to 
violate any of those sections, upon completion of ten years on 
parole outside of confinement and without violation, be termi-
nated from his sentence unless the person is earlier termi-
nated by the Board of Pardons and Parole. Any person who 
violates the terms of his parole, while serving parole, shall at 
the discretion of the Board of Pardons and Parole be recom-
mitted to prison to serve the portion of the balance of his term 
as determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole, but not to 
exceed the maximum term 
(2) Any person paroled following a former parole revocation 
may not be discharged from his sentence until either: 
(a) he has served three years on parole outside of 
confinement and without violation, or in the case of a 
person convicted of violating Section 76-5-301.1, Subsec-
tion 76-5-302(l)(e), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-
402 2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-
404.1, or 76-5-405, or at tempting to violate any of those 
sections, ten years on parole outside of confinement and 
without violation; 
(b) his maximum sentence has expired; or 
(c) the Board of Pardons and Parole so orders. 
(3) (a) All time served on parole, outside of confinement 
and without violation constitutes service of the total 
sentence but does not preclude the requirement of serving 
a three-year or ten-year, as the case may be, parole term 
outside of confinement and without violation. 
(b) Any time a person spends outside of confinement 
after commission of a parole violation does not constitute 
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(a) third degree felony shall be as if the conviction were 
for a first degree felony; 
(b) second degree felony shall be as if the conviction 
were for a first degree felony; or 
(c) first degree felony shall remain the penalty for a 
first degree penalty except: 
(i) the convicted person is not eligible for proba-
tion; and 
(ii) the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider 
that the convicted person is a habitual violent of-
fender as an aggravating factor to determine the 
length of incarceration. 
(4) (a) In all cases, notice that the prosecution intends to 
seek punishment as a habitual violent offender under this 
section shall be provided in writing and shall be served 
upon the defendant or his attorney not later than ten days 
prior to trial. Notice shall include the case number, court, 
and date of conviction or commitment of any case relied 
upon by the prosecution. 
(b) (i) The defendant shall serve notice in writing upon 
the prosecutor if the defendant intends to deny that: 
(A) the defendant is the person who was con-
victed or committed; 
(B) the defendant was represented by counsel 
or had waived counsel; or 
(C) the defendant's plea was understanding^ 
or voluntarily entered. 
(ii) The notice of denial shall be served not later 
than five days prior to trial and shall state in detail 
the defendant's contention regarding the previous 
conviction and commitment. 
(c) The court shall determine if this section applies 
prior to or at the time of sentencing. The court shall 
consider any evidence presented at trial and a shall afford 
the prosecution and the defendant an opportunity to 
present any necessary additional evidence. Prior to sen-
tencing under this section, the court shall determine 
whether this section is applicable by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
(d) If any previous conviction and commitment is based 
upon a plea of guilty or no contest, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the conviction and commitment were 
regular and lawful in all respects if the conviction and 
commitment occurred after January 1, 1970. If the con-
viction and commitment occurred prior to January 1, 
1970, the burden is on the prosecution to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was 
then represented by counsel or had lawfully waived his 
right to have counsel present, and that his plea was 
understandingly and voluntarily entered. 
(e) If the court finds this section applicable, it shall 
enter that specific finding on the record and shall indicate 
in the order of judgment and commitment that the defen-
dant has been found by the court to be a habitual violent 
offender and is sentenced under this section. 
(5) The habitual violent offender provisions of this section 
are not an element of the offense, and proof of a defendant's 
conduct as a habitual violent offender is not necessary at a 
preliminary hearing or at trial. 
(6) (a) The sentencing enhancement provisions of Sections 
76-3-407 and 76-3-408 shall apply to a felony conviction 
defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, Par t 4, Sexual Offenses, 
and shall supersede the provisions of this section. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a): 
(i) the convictions under Sections 76-5-404 and 
76-5a-3 shall be governed by the enhancement provi-
sions of this section; and 
(ii) the "violent felony" offense defined in Subsec-
tion (l)(c) shall include any felony sexual offense 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Par t 4, Sexual Of-
fenses, to determine if the convicted person is a 
habitual violent offender. 1995 
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction — Term of impris-
onment. 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be 
sentenced to imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding six months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding ninety days. 1973 
76-3-205. Infraction conviction — Fine, forfeiture, and 
disqualification. 
(1) A person convicted of an infraction may not be impris-
oned but may be subject to a fine, forfeiture, and disqualifica-
tion, or any combination. 
(2) Whenever a person is convicted of an infraction and no 
punishment is specified, the person may be fined as for a class 
C misdemeanor. 1973 
76-3-206. Capital felony — Penalties. 
(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of a 
capital felony shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 
76-3-207. That sentence shall be death, life imprisonment, or, 
on or after April 27, 1992, life in prison without parole. 
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall 
be subject to automatic review by the Utah State Supreme 
Court within 60 days after certification by the sentencing 
court of the entire record unless time is extended an additional 
period not to exceed 30 days by the Utah State Supreme Court 
for good cause shown. Such review by the Utah State Supreme 
Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be 
heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Utah State 
Supreme CGU.. 1992 
76-3-207. Capital felony — Sentencing proceeding. 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found 
guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further proceedings 
before the court or jury on the issue of sentence. In the case of 
a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing proceedings 
shall be conducted by the court which accepted the plea or by 
a jury upon request of the defendant. When a defendant has 
been found guilty of a capital felony, the proceedings shall be 
conducted before the court or jury which found the defendant 
guilty, provided the defendant may waive hearing before the 
jury, in which event the hearing shall be before the court. If, 
however, circumstances make it impossible or impractical to 
reconvene the same jury for the sentencing proceedings the 
court may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury for such 
proceedings. If a retrial of the sentencing proceedings is 
necessary as a consequence of a remand from an appellate 
court, the sentencing authority shall be determined as pro-
vided in Subsection (4). 
(2) (a) In capital sentencing proceedings, evidence may be 
presented on: 
(i) the nature and circumstances of the crime; 
(ii) the defendant's character, background, history, 
mental and physical condition; 
(iii) the victim and the impact of the crime on the 
victim's family and community without comparison to 
other persons or victims; and 
(iv) any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of 
the penalty that the court considers relevant to the 
sentence. 
(b) Any evidence the court considers to have probative 
force may be received regardless of its admissibility under 
the exclusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney 
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and the defendant shall be permitted to present argument 
for or against sentence of death. 
(3) Aggravating circumstances shall include those outlined 
in Section 76-5-202. Mitigating circumstances shall include: 
(a) the defendant has no significant history of prior 
criminal activity; 
(b) the homicide was committed while the defendant 
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance; 
(c) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under 
the substantial domination of another person; 
(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was 
substantially impaired as a result of mental disease, 
intoxication, or influence of drugs; 
(e) the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
(f) the defendant was an accomplice in the homicide 
committed by another person and his participation was 
relatively minor; and 
(g) any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
(4) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to 
Consider the penalty. In all proceedings before a jury, under 
this section, it shall be instructed as to the punishment to be 
imposed upon a unanimous verdict for death and that the 
Penalty of either life in prison or with regard to sentences to be 
imposed on or after April 27, 1992, life in prison without 
Parole, shall be imposed if a unanimous verdict for death is not 
found. If the jury reports unanimous agreement to impose the 
sentence of death, the court shall discharge the jury and shall 
impose the sentence of death. If the jury is unable to reach a 
Unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of death, with 
regard to sentences to be imposed on or after April 27, 1992, 
the court shall instruct the jury to determine by a unanimous 
vote whether the penalty of life in prison without parole shall 
he imposed. If the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the court 
shall discharge the jury and impose the sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
(5) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence is 
of death, the appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error in the 
sentencing proceeding only, may set aside the sentence of 
death and remand the case to the trial court for new sentenc-
ing proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the error or 
errors. No error in the sentencing proceedings shall result in 
the reversal of the conviction of a capital felony. In cases of 
remand for new sentencing proceedings, all exhibits and a 
transcript of all testimony and other evidence properly admit-
ted in the prior trial and sentencing proceedings shall be 
admissible in the new sentencing proceedings, and if the 
sentencing proceeding was before a: 
(a) jury, a new jury shall be impaneled for the new 
sentencing proceeding; 
(b) judge, the original trial judge shall conduct the new 
sentencing proceeding; or 
(c) judge, and the original trial judge is unable or 
unavailable to conduct a new sentencing proceeding, then 
another judge shall be designated to conduct the new 
sentencing proceeding. 
(6) In the event the death penalty is held to be unconstitu-
tional by the Utah Supreme Court or the United States 
Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person 
Previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause 
such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall 
sentence the person to life in prison, if the death penalty is 
held unconstitutional prior to April 27, 1992. or life in prison 
without parole if the death penalty is held unconstitutional on 
or after April 27, 1992, and any person who is thereafter 
convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced to life in prison 
or life in prison without parole. 1995 
76-3-207.5. Applicability — Effect on sentenc ing — Op-
t ions of offenders. 
(1) The sentencing option of life without parole provided in 
Sections 76-3-201 and 76-3-207 applies only to those capital 
offenses for which the offender is sentenced on or after April 
27,1992. The sentencing option of fife without parofe provided 
in Sections 76-3-201 and 76-3-207 has no effect on sentences 
imposed in capital cases prior to April 27, 1992. 
(2) An offender, who commits a capital offense prior to April 
27, 1992, but is sentenced on or after April 27, 1992, shall be 
given the option, prior to a sentencing hearing pursuant to 
Section 76-3-207, to proceed either under the law which was in 
effect at the time the offense was committed or under the 
additional sentencing option of life in prison without parole 
Provided in Sections 76-3-201 and 76-3-207. 1992 
76-3-208. Imprisonment — Custodial authori t ies . 
(1) Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be committed 
to the following custodial authorities: 
(a) felony commitments shall be to the Utah State 
Prison; 
(b) (i) class A misdemeanor commitments shall be to 
the jail, or other facility designated by the town, city, 
or county where the defendant was convicted, unless 
the defendant consents to commitment to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed 
one year; 
(ii) if the defendant consents to commitment to the 
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to 
exceed one year, the court may impose the sentence. 
The court may not order the imprisonment of a 
defendant to the Utah State Prison for a fixed term or 
other term that is inconsistent with this section and 
Section 77-18-4; 
(c) all other misdemeanor commitments shall be to the 
jailor other facility designated by the town, city or county 
where the defendant was convicted. 
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a facility 
other than the one to which he was committed when: 
(a) it does not have space to accommodate him; or 
(b) the security of the institution or inmate requires it. 
1995 
PART 3 
FINES AND SPECIAL SANCTIONS 
76-3-301. F ines of persons. 
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay 
3 fine, not exceeding: 
(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first degree or 
second degree; 
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third degree; 
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction; 
(d) $1,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction; 
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or infrac-
tion conviction; and 
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by stat-
ute. 
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, 
Partnership, government, or governmental instrumentality. 
1995 
76-3-301.5. Uniform fine schedule — Judic ia l CounciL 
(1) The Judicial Council shall establish a uniform recom-
ihended fine schedule for each offense under Subsection 76-3-
301(1). 
(a) The fine for each offense shall proportionally reflect 
the seriousness of the offense and other factors as deter-
mined in writing by the Judicial Council. 
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(b) The schedule shall be reviewed annually by the 
Judicial Council. 
(c) The fines shall be collected under Section 77-18-1. 
(2) The schedule shall incorporate: 
(a) criteria for determining aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances; and 
(b) guidelines for enhancement or reduction of the fine, 
based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
(3) Presentence investigation reports shall include docu-
mentation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as 
determined under the criteria, and a recommended fine under 
the schedule. 
(4) The Judicial Council shall also establish a separate 
uniform recommended fine schedule for the juvenile court and 
by rule provide for its implementation. 
(5) This section does not prohibit the court from in its 
discretion imposing no fine, or a fine in any amount up to and 
including the maximum fine, for the offense. 1988 
76-3-302. Fines of corporations, associations, partner-
ships, or government instrumental it ies . 
A corporation, association, partnership, or governmental 
instrumentality shall pay a fine for an offense defined in this 
code for which no special corporate fine is specified. The fine 
shall not exceed: 
(1) $20,000 for a felony conviction; 
(2) $10,000 for a class A misdemeanor conviction; 
(3) $5,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction; and 
(4) $1,000 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or for 
an infraction conviction. 1995 
76-3-303. Additional sanct ions against corporation or 
associat ion — Advertis ing of convict ion — 
Disqualif ication of officer. 
(1) When a corporation or association is convicted of an 
offense, the court may, in addition to or in lieu of imposing 
other authorized sanctions, require the corporation or associa-
tion to give appropriate publicity of the conviction by notice to 
the class or classes of persons or section of the public inter-
ested in or affected by the conviction, by advertising in 
designated areas, or by designated media or otherwise. 
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a 
corporation or association is convicted of an offense committed 
in furtherance of the affairs of the corporation or association, 
the court may include in the sentence an order disqualifying 
him from exercising similar functions in the same or other 
corporations or associations for a period of not exceeding five 
years if it finds the scope or willfulness of his illegal actions 
make it dangerous or inadvisable for such functions to be 
entrusted to him. 1973 
PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecu t i ve s e n t e n c e s — 
Limitations. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been ad-
judged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the 
court states in the sentence tha t they shall run consecutively. 
(2) The court shall order tha t sentences for state offenses 
shall run consecutively if the new offense is committed while 
the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds 
tod states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be 
^appropriate. 
(3) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
he offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
(4) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 
76-1-401. 
(5) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate 
maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years 
imprisonment. However, this limitation does not apply if an 
offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(6) The limitation in Subsection (5) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one 
offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more 
offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition 
of sentence for any one or more of them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state 
other than the present sentencing court or by a court ol 
another state or federal jurisdiction. 
(7) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and 
the manner in which they shall be served, the Board oi 
Pardons and Parole shall t reat the defendant as though he has 
been committed for a single term that shall consist of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-yeai 
limitation the maximum sentence is considered to be 3C 
years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively 
the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the 
validly imposed minimum terms. 
(8) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed tc 
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently 
being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the greatei 
and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences 
are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence 
with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be 
served. 
(9) This section may not be construed to restrict the numbei 
or length of individual consecutive sentences that may be 
imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed 
but only to limit the length of sentences actually served undei 
the commitments. 
(10) This section may not be construed to limit the author 
ity of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanoi 
cases. 199* 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circum 
stances of the offense of which the defendant was found guiltj 
and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes il 
would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being foi 
tha t degree of offense established by statute and to sentenc( 
the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to thai 
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically providec 
by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree 
of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the convictior 
is considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class I 
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within th< 
limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and th< 
defendant is placed on probation, whether committee 
to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged with 
out violating his probation; and 
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the pros 
ecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by eithe 
party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice 
76-8-501 CRIMINAL CODE 238 
PARTS 
FALSIFICATION IN OFFICIAL MATTERS 
76-8-501. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Official proceeding" means any proceeding before a 
legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmen-
tal body or official authorized by law to take evidence 
under oath or affirmation, including a notary or other 
person taking evidence in connection with any of these 
proceedings. 
(2) "Material" means capable of affecting the course or 
outcome of the proceeding. A statement is not material if 
it is retracted in the course of the official proceeding in 
which it was made before it became manifest that the 
falsification was or would be exposed and before it sub-
stantially affected the proceeding. Whether a statement is 
material is a question of law to be determined by the 
court. 1973 
76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any 
official proceeding: 
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or 
affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of a material 
statement previously made and he does not believe the 
statement to be true; or 
(2) He makes inconsistent material statements under 
oath or affirmation, both within the period of limitations, 
one of which is false and not believed by him to be true. In 
a prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or 
proved which of the statements is false but only that one 
or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to 
be true. 1973 
76-8-503. False or inconsistent statements. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(1) He makes a false statement under oath or affirma-
tion or swears or affirms the truth of the statement 
previously made and he does not believe the statement to 
be true if: 
(a) The falsification occurs in an official proceed-
ing, or is made with a purpose to mislead a public 
servant in performing his official functions; or 
(b) The statement is one which is required by law 
to be sworn or affirmed before a notary or other 
person authorized to administer oaths; or 
(2) He makes inconsistent statements under oath or 
affirmation, both within the period of limitations, one of 
which is false and not believed by him to be true. In a 
prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or 
proved which of the statements is false but only that one 
or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to 
be true. 
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section if he 
retracts the falsification before it becomes manifest that 
the fafsificatibn was or woufd be exposed. 1973 
76-8-504. Written false statement. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(1) He makes a written false statement which he does 
not believe to be true on or pursuant to a form bearing a 
notification authorized by law to the effect that false 
statements made therein are punishable; or 
(2) With intent to deceive a public servant in the 
performance of his official function, he. 
(a) Makes any written false statement which he 
does not believe to be true; or 
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a writ-
ten application for any pecuniary or other benefit by 
omitting information necessary to prevent stated 
ments therein from being misleading; or 
(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing 
which he knows to be lacking in authenticity; or ; 
(d) Submits or invites reliance on any sample* 
specimen, map, boundary mark, or other object which 
he knows to be false. ^ 
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section if ^ 
retracts the falsification before it becomes manifest that 
the falsification was or would be exposed. 19^3 
76-8-505. Perjury or false swearing — Proof of falsity 
of statements — Denial of criminal guilt 
(1) On any prosecution for perjury or false swearing, except 
a prosecution upon inconsistent statements, pursuant to Sub-
section 76-8-502(2), falsity of a statement may not be estab-
lished solely through contradiction by the testimony of a single 
witness. 
(2) No prosecution shall be brought under this part when 
the substance of the defendant's false statement is his denial 
of guilt in a previous criminal trial. 1973 
76-8-506. Provision of false information to law en-
forcement officers, government agencies, or 
specified professionals. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
(1) knowingly gives or causes to be given false informa-
tion to any law enforcement officer with a purpose of 
inducing the officer to believe that another has committed 
an offense; or 
(2) knowingly gives or causes to be given to any law 
enforcement officer, any state or local government agency 
or personnel, or to any person licensed in this state to 
practice social work, psychology, or marriage and family 
therapy, information concerning the commission of an 
offense, knowing that the offense did not occur or knowing 
tha t he has no information relating to the offense or 
danger. 1988 
76-8-507. False personal information to peace officer. 
A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent of 
misleading a peace officer as to his identity, birth date, or place 
of residence, he knowingly gives a false name, birth date, or 
address to a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his official 
duties. 1983 
76-8-508. Tampering with witness — Retaliation 
against witness or informant — Bribery — 
Communicating a threat. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about 
to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a 
person to: 
(a) testify or inform falsely; 
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document, 
item; 
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evi-
dence,* or 
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation 
to which he has been summoned. 
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he: 
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for any-
thing done by another as a witness or informant; 
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in 
consideration of his doing any of the acts specified under 
Subsection (1); or 
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reason-
able person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury 
to the person, because of any act performed or to be 
performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or 
informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 1988 
3 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed . 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court ofAppeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed . 1986 
78-2-7.5. Serv ice of sheriff to court . 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986, 1988 
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Terms — Functions — 
Creation — Seal. 
Number of judges 
Filing fees. 
Court ofAppeals jurisdiction. 
Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Location of Court ofAppeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court ofAppeals. The 
Court ofAppeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court ofAppeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court ofAppeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court ofAppeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court ofAppeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court ofAppeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court ofAppeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court ofAppeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels, 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the CWj 
Appeals; and , 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme (% 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court ofAppeals are the same as J 
the Supreme Court. jj 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. ; : 
(1) The Court ofAppeals has jurisdiction to issue alf A 
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necesgar 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and d 
crees; or ^ 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. ^ 
(2) The Court ofAppeals has appellate jurisdiction, incluc 
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
 F 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from forma 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals frou 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed 
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Comnus 
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutiona 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereigt 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board oi 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from 
the small claims department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court ofAppeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court ofAppeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court ofAppeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1W5 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. *986 
78-2a-5. Location of Court ofAppeals. 
The Court ofAppeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court ofAppeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location withm the state l9S* 
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STATE OF UTAH 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
REGION V, CEDAR CITY 
2134 North Main 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801)586-0102 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
Date Due: 10-05-95 
Sentencing Date: 10-10-95 
JUDGE ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
CEDAR CITY IRON UTAH 
(CITY) (COUNTY) 
RODNEY SEYMOUR INVESTIGATOR 
NAME: ANDERSON, MARK DONELSON 
ALIASES: MARK ANDERSON 
ADDRESS: IRON COUNTY 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, CEDAR CITY, 
UTAH 
BIRTHDATE: 01-06-50 AGE: 45 
BIRTHPLACE: SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
LEGAL RESIDENCE: UTAH 
MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED 
COURT CASE NO: 941500984 
OBSCIS NO: 99914957 
CO-DEFENDANTS: NONE 
OFFENSE: DUI/Class A; DRIVING ON 
SUSPENSION/Class B; FALSE 
INFORMATION TO POLICE/Class B 
PLEA: NOT ANNOUNCED, FOUND 
GUILTY IN DEFENDANTS ABSENCE 
DATE: 04-24-95 
PROSECUTING ATTY: SCOTT M BURNS 
DEFENSE ATTY: JAMES M PARK 
PAGE 2 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
ANDERSON, MARK D 
PLEA BARGAIN: Mark Anderson was originally charged with DUI, a Class A Misdemeanor; Driving 
on Suspension, a Class B Misdemeanor; and False Information to Police, a Class B Misdemeanor. On 
04-24-95, the Defendant was convicted in all three counts in his absence. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorneys Office. 
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: On October 8, 1994, on 1-15 near Cedar city, Utah, Adam 
Russell was driving a vehicle (pulling a trailer) and headed toward his home when he was struck 
violently from behind by another vehicle. Mr. Russell's vehicle careened off the highway and rolled, 
causing extensive and serious injuries to Mr. Russell, including neck injuries that required treatment 
with a "halo" and pins in his head. UHP Trooper Doug Twitchell responded to the accident scene and 
located another male individual "hiding in the bushes" and obviously intoxicated. The individual, later 
identified as Mark D. Anderson, initially gave Trooper Twitchell the name of his brother (who is 
deceased), and it took several hours for Trooper Twitchell to learn that the Defendant had provided a 
false name. The State of Utah believes that the Defendant submitted a fa1:- name because he has an 
extensive criminal record and had numerous wants and warrants for DUI's and other traffic offenses. 
Trooper Twitchell also learned that the Defendant has not had a valid Utah driver's license since 1985. 
After several trials in absentia, and several efforts to locate the Defendant for trial and sentencing, the 
Defendant was ultimately convicted (in his absence) on April 24, 1995, of Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor (DUI involving injuries); Driving on a Suspended or Revoked 
License, a Class B Misdemeanor; and False Information to a Law Enforcement Officer, a Class B 
Misdemeanor. The Defendant fled to the State of Oregon, was located, and refused to waive extradition. 
The Iron County Attorney's Office forwarded Governor's Warrant extradition documents to Oregon. 
After several hearings in Oregon regarding extradition, days before the Governor's Warrant was to 
arrive, the Defendant waived extradition and was returned to Utah. 
On September 6, 1995, the Defendant appeared before the Court for sentencing. The Court ordered a 
presentence investigation report prior to sentencing, which has been set for October 10, 1995, at 9:00 
a.m. in Cedar City, Utah. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Iron County Attorney's Office. 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: "I was driving south bound on 115 from Salt Lake to 
St. George I was in slow lane and seen tail lights of vie in front of me so I put on left hand sig and all of 
a sudden a trailer right in front of me being towed with no tail lights and couldn't hardly see it even 
being right on top of it. So I turned to the left and hit trailer on left side, my car on right side, of front of 
car if there would have been lights on trailer that was being towed there wouldn't have been an accident, 
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also it appeard to me the vie. was under min speed but I could be wrong about that. Also I had two 
drinks before I left Salt Lake and none on the road there was no alcohol in my car. I had been on road 4 
to 5 hours plus stoped and got a hamburger to eat on way before all this happened. Also you have this as 
a promise there will be no more DUIs cuz I quit drinking." 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Written statement made by Mark D. Anderson. 
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS: None 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Police Reports and investigators comments. 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT. The victim's wife in this matter responded with a typed letter. Her 
letter is attached for the courts review. 
The victim's wife indicated that the Defendant had to be life flighted to LDS Hospital, also that the 
family along with the children had suffered extensively due to the lack of the fathers physical abilities. 
The recommendation by the victim indicated the following: "We feel Mark Anderson should be 
punished to the fullest extent of the law. And even then, it is still not enough. My husband spent 
longer out of work, than Mark Anderson ever will in jail. Also, we lost more money and property, 
than Mark Anderson will ever own from this accident." 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Victim's wife. 
RESTITUTION: According to the victim's wife in this matter, there is pending civil litigation. The 
victim's family indicated that much of their losses was covered by the State of Utah insurance and 
various sources. (Please see victim letter). 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Investigation by this officer. 
CUSTODY STATUS: Mark Anderson was arrested on 06-15-95 in Oregon. If sentencing takes place 
on 10-10-95 he will have served 117 days incarcerated. Mr. Anderson was booked into the Iron County 
Facility in Cedar City on 08-25-95. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Utah State Iron County Correctional Facility and Defendant. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: Doug Twitchell of the Utah State Highway Patrol, and also 
the investigating officer on this matter indicated that Mr. Anderson needs serious help and/or put him 
away. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Law enforcement officers comment. 
JUVENILE RECORD: According to a presentence report prepared by the State of Utah/Adult 
Probation and Parole, on or about 05-05-80, it indicated that the Defendant had the following juvenile 
record between 1961 and 1967. Destruction of Property, Destruction of Property, Truancy, Theft, 
Trespassing, Depriving Owner of Vehicle, Theft, Curfew, Auto Theft, Fraud, and Public Intoxication 
with Possession of Tobacco. According to the presentence report prepared by the State of Utah, it 
indicated that Mr. Anderson was committed to the Utah State Industrial School in October of 1965 and 
he served approximately one year in that institution. Mr. Anderson may want to expound on his juvenile 
record. The Defendant indicated many of these entries did not result in convictions. 
SOURCE Ob INFORMATION: Adult Probation and Parole presentence report prepared on or about 
05-05-80 and Defendant. 
ADULT RECORD: Using the name Mark D. Anderson with the date of birth 01-06-50, it shows that 
the Defendant in this matter has an FBI number of 723272G. This also appears to match the SSN listed 
by arresting officers on this current matter of 528-74-2928. 
DATE AGENCY OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
01-17-69 Salt Lake City SO Burglary, Grand Larceny Dismissed per this agencies 
Utah information 
10-19-69 Salt Lake City SO 
Utah 




San Diego PD 
California 
Salt Lake City PD 
Utah 
Burglary/Criminal 
Conspiracy reduced To 
Petty Larceny 
Grand Larceny, Burglary I 
Probation; terminated 10-20-70 
10-13-70 Burglary I dismissed, 
Grand Larceny reduced to lesser 
included offense of Petty Larceny 
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DATE AGENCY OFFENSE 






Salt Lake City SO 
Utah 




Driving On Revocation 
According to AP&P records, he 
was placed on Probation 
6 months Salt Lake County Jail, 12 
months probation and halfway 
house. According to AP records, this 
was terminated on 08-16-75. 
01-22-75 Salt Lake City SO 
Utah 
Failure to Appear, 
DUI 
No disposition 
05-15-76 Constable Three commitments: 
Failure To Appear, 
Receiving & Retaining 
Utah Safety Inspection 
Sticker, Displaying 
Unlawful Safety Inspection 
Sticker 












Driving on Revocation, 
Expired Safety Inspection 
Sticker 
DUI 
Failure To Appear 
Theft By Deception, 





Committed to the Utah 
State Prison on 05-13-80 
for 0-5 years 
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05-06-82 Salt Lake City SO Possession of Controlled Unknown 
Utah Substance 
12-18-82 Salt Lake City SO 
Utah 
DUI Unknown 
05-18-83 Centerville PD Larceny 
Utah 
Unknown 
06-14-85 Salt Lake City SO DUI. 
Utah 
Unknown 
06-20-85 Salt Lake City SO Shoplifting, False 
Utah Information to Police 
Unknown 
12-26-85 American Fork PD Theft By Receiving 
Utah 
Unknown 
02-03-86 Orem PD 
Utah 
Theft By Receiving Unknown 
02-11-86 American Fork PD Theft By Receiving 
Utah 
It appears Mr. Anderson was 
committed to Utah State Prison on 
10-24-86 for Theft By 
Receiving/Two Counts; 0-5 
years 
06-02-91 Salt Lake SO 
Utah 
DUI, Driving On 
Revocation, Never 
Obtaining a License, 
Unlicensed Person to 
Drive 
It appears case #912005318 
was reduced to Reckless 
Alcohol Related Class B, 
guilty 
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Las Vegas PD 
Nevada 
Salt Lake City SO 
Utah 
OFFENSE 
Possession of Controlled 
Substance - Felony 
DUI, Driving on 
Revocation, Speeding, 
License on Wrong 
Vehicle, FTA, Never 
Obtaining A License, 
Open Container, 
Intoxication, Allowing 
Unlicensed Person to Drive 
DISPOSITION 
$225 fine, reducfed to Misdemeanor 
Mr. Anderson in ordered review 
indicated he was in a car with four 
others. The car was stopped by 
police and someone threw an illicit 
drug out of the car. Mr. Anderson 







Las Vegas PD 
Nevada 
UHP 




DUI, Driving on 
Suspension, False Info, 
to Police Officer 
Mr. Anderson states he paid a 
$1,500 fine and matter is cleared 
successfully. 
Unknown 
Present Offense Pending 
10-18-94 Washington Co. SO DUI 
St. George, Utah 
Checks with Washington County 
Sheriffs Office and criminal courts 
in this jurisdiction showed no 
warrants or pending action. 
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Criminal history check, Adult Probation and Parole records of the 
State of Utah and oral/written interview with Mr. Anderson. 
DRIVING HISTORY: Mr. Anderson has many driving violations listed including speeding, improper 
registration, no license, faulty equipment and others. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Correctional records. 
PENDING CASES: There are no pending cases. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Criminal history check. 
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: It appears the Defendant was on supervision as a juvenile (please 
see juvenile criminal history). According to Utah State Adult Probation and Parole,rthe Defendant was 
under probation supervision between 1974 and 1975. According to the correctional records, the 
Defendant had major difficulties from repeated traffic offenses. It appears that probation was terminated 
on this matter in 1975. In 1980, the Defendant was referred to the Department of Utah Corrections for a 
presentence report for Carrying a Concealed Weapon, a Third Degree Felony. It appears that the 
Defendant was detained by store security at Grand Central stores in Weber County. It appears that the 
Defendant had on his possession a pistol. According to the presentence report, the Defendant handed the 
pistol to the arresting officer indicating that he was carrying it for self protection. It is noted that in Mr. 
Anderson's shoes during his arrest on this matter there was found a number of small white pills with 
crosses on the top. According to the presentence report, it appears that the pills were speed. Mr. 
Anderson indicated in oral interview with this investigator he was holding pills for his girlfriend. It 
appears that Mr. Anderson was committed to the Utah State Prison. Mr. Anderson was committed to the 
Utah State Prison also for Theft By Receiving, a Third Degree Felony/Two Counts. It appears the 
Defendant was committed in 1986 on this matter. It appears that the Department of Corrections and 
Board of Pardons closed their supervision of Mr. Anderson on or about 04-25-91 with successful 
termination. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Criminal history check, Utah State Corrections, Board of Pardons 
Information and interview with Defendant. 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: Mark Donelson Anderson was born 
January 6, 1950 in Salt Lake City, Utah to the union of Eugene and Elaine Anderson. There were two 
sons and one daughter born to the union. From a prior presentence report, the Defendant described his 
childhood as lousy that his mother and father fought like dogs and cats for as long as he could recall. 
The Defendant indicated that his father and mother were divorced when he was approximately 12 years 
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of age and that his mother consequently remarried Kenneth Hyde when he was approximately 14 years 
of age. The Defendant left home at 16 years of age. The Defendant was subsequently committed to the 
State Industrial School as a teenager. The Defendant has a sister still living. The Defendant's father's 
whereabouts are unknown. The Defendant's mother passed away in 1994. The Defendant plans to 
return to Oregon when this matter is resolved. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and presentence report. 
MARITAL HISTORY: The Defendant married LeAnn Williams on May 2, 1969 in San Diego, 
California. The Defendant was divorced in February 1979. The Defendant has three children as a result 
of that union. In 1982 the Defendant married Debbie Anderson, two children were born to this union. 
The Defendant was divorced in 1989. The children, ages 10 and 13, live in Oregon with their mother. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and correctional records. 
EDUCATION: The Defendant completed his eleventh grade at the Utah State Industrial School. The 
Defendant, according to a prior presentence report, had completed a General Motors school in the field 
of auto mechanics. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and prior presentence report. 
GANG AFFILIATIONS. The Defendant is not a member of any gangs. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Criminal history check and Defendant. 
PHYSICAL HEALTH: The Defendant describes his physical health as fair. Mr. Anderson indicated 
that since being incarcerated medical staff found a tumor in his back. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and presentence report. 
MENTAL HEALTH: The Defendant describes his mental health as being affected by the death of 
loved ones. It is noted Mr. Anderson's mother passed away recently along with other family members. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and investigator. 
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ALCOHOL HISTORY: The Defendant has numerous arrests related to alcohol. It appears to this 
investigator that this is a serious, intensive, and extensive problem for Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson 
indicated alcohol only became a real problem in the past four years. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Correctional records, criminal history check, and Defendant. 
DRUG HISTORY: The Defendant has a prior record which includes illicit drugs. Mr. Anderson 
indicated in oral interview with this investigator he's used marijuana several times. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Correctional records, criminal history check, and Defendant. 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: TheDefendant states he is self employed as a mechanic. He can earn 
between $1,000 or $2,000 per month when employed. The defendant's Social Security Number is 
528-74-2928. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Correctional records and Defendant. 
FINANCIAL SITUATION: The Defendant is basically indigent, having few assets. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant. 
MILITARY RECORD: The Defendant has never served in any branch of the armed services. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and investigators comments. 
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: A letter from the victim reads as follows: 
"Mark Anderson was the drunk driver who hit my husband from the behind while he was coming 
home from the Elk Hunt on October 8, 1994. (Victim) received a broken neck, broken ribs, and 
other cuts. He was taken by ambulance from the scene of the accident to Valley View Medical 
Center, where he was later transported by ambulance to the Cedar City Municipal Airport, where 
he was then taken by Life Flight, to the Salt Lake City International Airport, where once again, 
he was transported by ambulance, to L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. Where he then 
underwent surgery for 6 hours, to fix his broken neck. He was then in the hospital for 10 days. 
He had a halo screwed into his head for 2 lA months, then a collar (hard) for 2 54 month. He was 
out of work for a total of 6 months. He still has limited movement in his neck, and also limited 
use of his neck and also limited use of his right arm and hand. (Victim) will not be able to 
advance any further in his trade, due to his injuries. Our total lossess and medical bills have 
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exceeded well over the range of $ 150,000.00!!!! Our whole family has suffered a lot because of 
this accident. Our children were unable to have a normal relationship, that children do with their 
dads, because of his injuries. I had to take care of our 4 children, as well as for (victim) for 4 
months before, he could do normal things on his own. We feel Mark Anderson should be 
punished to the fullest extent of the law. And even then, it is still not enough. (Victim) spent 
longer out of work, then Mark Anderson ever will in jail. Also, we lost more money and 
property, then Mark Anderson will ever own from this accident. We lost these items: a Jeep 
Wagonneer, 4 wheeler, 16 foot trailer. All of these items were paid for priorto this accident. 
Because of this accident, and Mark Anderson being uninsured, we had to take a total loss for 
someone like this person who is out there driving on the streets and highways without any 
insurance what so ever. And, Mark Anderson still continues to drive uninsured and unlicensed 
whenever he wants, and he is going to end up killing someone some day if some action is not 
taken to this matter. We sincerely hope that you will take the time to really think about what 
kind of person this Mark Anderson really is, and what he could do to other people if no kind of 
action or extent of the law is used against him. Thank you for your time in this matter." 
A letter from Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, reads as follows: 
"The Defendant has shown, as evidenced by his criminal record, a complete and total disregard 
for the law and for the safety of others. He has driven without a driver's license since 1985, has 
been charged with multiple DUI and other traffic offenses, and attempts to continue driving by 
his professed sophistication in not being caught or convicted. The Defendant was extradited 
from Oregon where he fled under the assumption that he could not be extradited back to Utah. 
He was wrong. I sincerely believe that this Defendant is a danger to the good citizens of Utah, he 
will continue to drink and drive, and that he should serve the full eighteen (18) months 
incarceration in the Iron County Jail. I believe that is the only way the justice system will 
impress upon the severity of his actions. I strongly suggest that you contact the victim in this 
case for their recommendations as well." 
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: Brought before the court for sentencing is Mark Donelson Anderson, a 
45 year old male who has an extensive alcohol related criminal history. The Defendant has numerous 
prior arrests for DUI's according to the criminal history printout. It also appears according to this 
investigators information that the Defendant was not cooperative with law enforcement on this matter. It 
is noted that Mr. Anderson has been committed to the Utah State Prison on a prior occasion, and appears 
to know the law enforcement system well. The victim on this matter indicated that the Defendant should 
be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and this investigator concurs from the point of community 
safety. It is hoped that Mr. Anderson would use the tools that he has learned in the past and seek new 
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learning methods in avoiding the use of alcohol that has damaged his life and others as evidenced from 
this current criminal episode. 
Aggravating circumstances in this case in part appear to be: 
1. Extensive alcohol use history going back to 1970fs. 
2. The Defendant's lack of cooperation in this case including false information to police and 
extradition. 
3. Prior prison commitments. 
4. Prior probation and parole privilege. 
5. Extensive damage to property (vehicle). 
6. Extensive medical costs and disability to victim. 
7. Extensive criminal history includes burglary, weapons possession, and theft. 
8. Victim request for punishment. 
9. Prior juvenile record. 
10. Intensive criminal history, over 20 adult entries. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
RODNEY SEYMOUR, INVESTIGATOR 
AGENCY RECOMMENDATION 
D ™ " n o t be placed on probation bu, serve 18 months m the Iron County Jarl. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
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OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: 
1. ESCAPE OR FUGITIVE 
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3. UNUSUAL VICTIM VUNERABILITY 
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 ^ TMP -TIMF MATRIX" FOR ALL CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES EXCEPT THE 
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(Use Form 2 For Mandatory Sentence Situations) 
Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the 
guidelines. Reference the page number of the presentence investigation where 
the judge can find supportive information. 
Aggravating Circumstances 
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not implicit in the conviction 
offense or the calculation of criminal history score. 
PSI Page # 
i-r 1. Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct. 
2. Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior. 
3. Victim was particularly vulnerable. 
\s 4. Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive. 
5. Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity. 
}s 6. There were multiple charges or victims. 
Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less 
restrictive setting. 
8. Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest. 
9. Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify 
s as an high risk offender. . 
r 10. Other (specify) fV&s- pyv&A*fyVs> /yitfh fl^Sfa, 
Mitigating Circumstances 
1. Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened 
serious harm. 
2. Offender acted under strong provocation. 
3. There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal 
behavior, though failing to establish a defense. 
4. Offender is young. 
5. Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other 
crimes. 
6. Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration. 
7. Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision. 
8. Domestic crime victim does not want incarceration. 
9. Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family 
relationships. 
10. Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or 
dependents. <-v 
11. Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time. 
12. Other (specify) 
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